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Punishment Theory: Moral or Political?
Guyora Bindert
Is the justification of punishment a moral question?
Much contemporary writing on punishment, whether by
philosophers or legal scholars, treats it as such. Theories of
punishment are taken to be moral theories, and the
problem of justifying punishment is presented as a key
battle-ground in the war between utilitarian and
deontological ethics. The question of how and when the
state should punish is reduced to the question of how and
when particular persons should punish other persons. This
question in turn is treated as just a special case of the more
general question whether persons are morally obliged to
govern their actions by the aim of maximizing human
welfare or by rules of fair treatment.
But surely this is an odd way 'to think about
punishment. Punishment is not a behavior, but an
institution. It is part of a system that involves conduct
norms, an authoritative procedure for generating these
norms, an authoritative procedure for decisions to impose
sanctions, and some measure of practical power over
persons or resources. To punish someone is not just to
harm them, nor even just to harm them because of
something they have done. It is to stake a claim to a
certain kind of institutional authority, even when the
institution is only the family. To punish someone is to
assert a right and accept an obligation to punish anyone
similarly circumstanced and behaved, even if that other
person be only a sibling. Punishment is never the isolated
act of an individual: to punish is to act as an officer or
agent participating in a system for enforcing an
authoritatively promulgated norm.
Because punishment is part of a system of
institutional authority, it is not amenable to a simple moral
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analysis. The legitimacy of punishment is bound up with
the legitimacy of the norm it enforces and of the
institutions promulgating the norm, imposing the
punishment, and inflicting it. Thus, if we conceptualize the
utilitarian and retributivist penologies merely as moral
theories, both are implausible.
I. PUNISHMENT AND MORALITY
The implausibility of utilitarian morality as a guide to
penal policy is famously illustrated by the textbook
problem of framing the innocent. E.F. Carritt reasoned
from utilitarian premises that
if some kind of very cruel crime becomes common, and none
of the criminals can be caught, it might be highly expedient,
as an example, to hang an innocent man, if a charge against
him could be so framed that he were universally thought
guilty; indeed this would only fail to be an ideal instance of
utilitarian 'punishment' because the victim himself would
not have been so likely as a real felon to commit such a
crime in the future; in all other respects it would be
perfectly deterrent and therefore felicific.1
H.J. McCloskey posed a similar problem:2
Suppose that a sheriff were faced with the choice of either
framing a Negro for a rape that had aroused hostility to the
Negroes (a particular Negro generally believed to be guilty
but whom the sheriff knows not to be guilty)-and thus
preventing serious anti-Negro riots which would probably
lead to some loss of life and increased hatred of each other
by whites and Negroes-or of hunting for the guilty person
and thereby allowing the anti-Negro riots to occur, while
doing the best he can to combat them. In such a case the
sheriff, if he were an extreme utilitarian, would appear to be
1. E.F. Carritt, Ethical and Political Thinking 65 (1947).
2. H.J. McCloskey, A Non-Utilitarian Appproach to Punishment, 9 Inquiry
249, 253 (1965).
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committed to framing the Negro.'
McCloskey also provided a variant of the example, in
which the utilitarian framer is a stranger passing through
town rather than a public official.4 In all of these examples,
utilitarianism is thought to impose a moral obligation on
individuals always to choose the act that will maximize
utility. In other words, by "utilitarianism" these authors
mean "act-utilitarian ethics."5 The examples are contrived
to compel individuals who are committed to such an act-
utilitarian morality to act unfairly and dishonestly. These
counter-intuitive results suggest there is something wrong
with utilitarian premises.
Accordingly, these examples are widely thought to
illustrate the implausibility of the utilitarian theory of
punishment.6 Yet these examples proceed from a common
3. H.J. McCloskey, An Examination of Restricted Utilitarianism, 66 Phil.
Rev. 468-69 (1957).
4. McCloskey, supra note 2, at 256.
5. For the distinction between act-utilitarian and rule-utilitarian ethics, see
Richard B. Brandt, Ethical Theory 380 (1959).
6. G.E.M. Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, in Ethics 206-07 (Judith J.
Thomson and Gerald Dworkin eds., 1968); Philip Bean, Punishment 34 (1981);
Carritt, supra note 1, at 65; Alan Donagan, Is There a Credible Form of
Utilitarianism?, in Contemporary Utilitiarianism 187-202 (Michael D. Bayles, ed.,
1968); Charles Fried, Right and Wrong 59-64 (1978); Alan Goldman, Beyond
Deterrence Theory: Comments on van Den Haag's "Punishment as a Device for
Controlling the Crime Rate," 33 Rutgers L. Rev. 721, 722 (1981); Lenn Goodman,
On Justice 50 (1991); D.H. Hodgson, Consequences of Utilitarianism (1967); D.K.
Lewis, Utilitarianism and Truthfulness, 50 Australasian J. Phil. 17 (1972);
Steven Lukes, Five Fables About Human Rights, 40 Dissent 427 (1993); J.D.
Mabbott, Punishment, 48 Mind 152 (1939); McCloskey, supra note 2; McCloskey,
supra note 3; Richard McCormick, Ambiguity in Moral Choice, in Doing Evil to
Achieve Good 7, 33 (Richard McCormick & Paul Ramsey eds., 1978); Edmund
Pincoffs, The Rationale of Legal Punishment 33-35 (1966); Jeffrey Reiman &
Ernest van Den Haag, On the Common Saying that it is Better that Ten Guilty
Persons Escape Than that One Innocent Suffer: Pro and Con, in Crime,
Culpability and Remedy 234-35 (Ellen Frankel et al. eds., 1990); George Schedler,
Behavior Modification and "Punishment" of the Innocent: Towards a Justification
of the Institution of Legal Punishment 11-20, 73-99 (1977); C.L. Ten, Crime, Guilt
and Punishment, 13-14 (1987); Ernest van Den Haag, Punishing Criminals:
Concerning a Very Old and Painful Question, 27-29 (1975); Ernest van Den Haag,
Punishment as a Device for Controlling the Crime Rate, 33 Rutgers L. Rev. 706
(1981); Donald Beschle, Whats Guilt (Or Deterrence) Got To Do With It?: The
Death Penalty, Ritual, and Mimetic Violence, 38 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 487 n.119
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(1997); Michael Louis Corrado, Punishment and the Wild Beast of Prey: The
Problem of Preventive Detention, 86 J. Crim. L. 778, 781 (1996); David De
Gregorio, People v. Marrero and Mistake of Law, 54 Brooklyn L. Rev. 229, 279
n.220 (1988); Anthony Dillof, Punishing Bias: An Examination of the Theoretical
Foundations of Bias Crime Statutes, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1015, 1026 (1997)
("utilitarianism would recommend such counter-intuitive practices as ...
convicting those known to be innocent if sufficient deterrence was achieved.");
James Duane, What Message Are We Sending to Criminal Jurors When We Ask
Them to "Send a Message" With Their Verdict?, 22 Am. J. Crim. L. 565, 603 n.121
(1995) (asserting that punishing the innocent is a "perennial problem for the
utilitarian model of punishment"); David Fried, Rationalizing Criminal
Forfeiture, 79 J. Crim. L. 328, 386 n.269 (1988) ("From a utilitarian point of view,
punishment of innocent persons is perfectly justified for its deterrent effect, at
least if the suffering prevented by the deterrence of future crime outweighs the
suffering inflicted by present punishment."); Steven Gey, Justice Scalia's Death
Penalty, 20 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 67 (1992); Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in 4
Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice 1336, 1337-38 (1983) ("utilitarianism admits
the possibility of justified punishment of the innocent"); Kent Greenawalt,
"Prescriptive Equality": Two Steps Forward, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1265, 1288 n.62
(1997) (asserting that utilitarians need to qualify their position by imposing
deontological restraints if they are to avoid condoning the punishment of the
innocent); Helene Greenwald, Capital Punishment for Minors: An Eighth
Amendment Analysis, 74 J. Crim. L. 1471, 1508 n.200 (1983) (under "utilitarian
rationale, a man whom the authorities knew to be innocent could be punished, if
members of the community believed him guilty and threatened to seek personal
revenge unless he were punished."); John Lawrence Hill, Law and the Concept of
the Core Self: Toward a Reconciliation of Naturalism and Humanism, 80 Marq. L.
Rev. 289, 314 n.94 (1997); Leo Katz, Blackmail and Other Forms of Arm-
Twisting, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1567, 1586 (1993) ("utilitarian account of
punishment... would permit the punishment of mere innocents for the sake of
some utilitarian goal."); Karen Lutjen, Culpability and Sentencing Under
Mandatory Minimus and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The Punishment No
Longer Fits the Criminal, 10 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 389, 392
(1996); Leo Martinez, Federal Tax Amnesty: Crime and Punishment Revisited, 10
Va. Tax Rev. 535, 573 n.160 (1991); Toni Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American
Criminal Law, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1880, 1887 n.80 (1991); Christopher Peters,
Foolish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity, and Justice in Stare Decisis, 105
Yale L.J. 2031, 2042 (1996) ("Bentham (although perhaps not Mill) would have
considered the punishment of the innocent person to be a morally 6righti act if
ultimately it resulted in more total happiness than would have existed if the
person had not been punished. Under Bentham's form of persons."); Tamara
Piety, Scorched Earth: How the Expansion of the Civil Forfeiture Act Has Laid
Waste to Due Process, 45 U. Miami L. Rev. 911, 973 (1991); Margaret Jane Radin,
Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849, 1878 n.105 (1987) (claiming
utilitarians need "fancy footwork" to avoid endorsing punishment of innocent
people); Nancy Rhoden, The Judge In the Delivery Room: The Emergence of
Court-Ordered Cesarians, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 1951, 1995 (1986); David Richards, The
Moral Criticism of Law 232-33 (1977); Ronald Rychlak, Society's Moral Right to
Punish: A Further Exploration of the Denunciation Theory of Punishment, 65
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misunderstanding of utilitarian penology.7 They depend on
formulating the question of whether and whom to punish
as a moral dilemma confronting an individual. If the
question is reformulated as whether to establish an
institution empowered to frame innocents whenever its
agents determine that doing so will advance social welfare,
utilitarianism will offer a very different answer. Such an
institution would be exceedingly dangerous to the liberty
and security of every citizen. Thus, Rawls:
Try to imagine, then, an institution (which we may call
"telishment") which is such that the officials set up by it
have authority to arrange a trial for the condemnation of an
innocent man whenever they are of the opinion that doing
so would be in the interests of society. The discretion of
officials is limited, however, by the rule that they may not
condemn an innocent man to undergo such an ordeal unless
there is, at the time, a wave of offenses similar to that with
which they charge him and telish him for.... Once one
realizes that one is involved in setting up an institution, one
sees that the hazards are very great. For example, what
check is there on the officials? How is one to tell whether or
not their actions are authorized? How is one to limit the
risks involved in allowing such systematic deception? How
is one to avoid giving anything short of complete discretion
to the authorities to telish anyone they like? In addition to
these considerations, it is obvious that people will come to
have a very different attitude towards their penal system
when telishment is adjoined to it. They will be uncertain as
to whether a convicted man has been punished or telished.
They will wonder whether or not they should feel sorry for
Tul. L. Rev. 299, 324 n.93 ("If a judge were actually to follow a utilitarian theory
of punishment, the judge might actually be required to punish a defendant who
was widely believed to be guilty, even if the judge knew the defendant to be
innocent."); Michael Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and Criminals: Utilitarian
Theory and the Problem of Crime Control, 94 Yale L.J. 315, 320 n.11 (1984);
Kenneth Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. Rev. 463, 504 n.141
(1992). R.J. Spujt, The Relevance of Culpability to the Punishment and
Prevention of Crime, 19 Akron L.J. 197, 199 (1985).
7. This point is developed at length in Guyora Binder & Nicholas J. Smith,
Framed: Utilitarianism and Punishment of the Innocent, 32 Rutgers L.J. 115
(2000).
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him. They will wonder whether the same fate won't at any
time fall on them. If one pictures how such an institution
would actually work, and the enormous risks involved in it,
it seems clear that it would serve no useful purpose. A
utilitarian justification for this institution is most unlikely.'
Robert Goodin adds:
Once it becomes public knowledge that, as a matter of
policy, we are willing to hang innocent people to assuage a
baying mob ... then everyone starts worrying: Who will be
next? The anxieties associated with such thoughts
systematically occurring across the whole population will
more than suffice to cancel the utility advantages of...
throwing one prisoner to the mob on any given occasion.'
Utilitarianism, which presumes that individuals
8. John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 44 Phil. Rev. 3, 11-12 (1955).
9. Goodin explains further:
My point is . . . that public officials cannot systematically violate people's
rights, as a matter of policy, and expect that policy to continue yielding the
same utility payoffs time and again. Take the case of punishing criminal
offenders, for example. The criminal sanction deters crime only in so far as
it is imposed on the guilty and only the guilty. Introducing any probability
that the innocent will be punished along with the guilty narrows the
expected utility gap between criminal and noncriminal conduct, and
increases the temptation for everyone to commit a crime. Thus, if we were
as a matter of policy to punish people whether or not they were guilty, just
according to some utilitarian calculation of public convenience on a case-by-
case basis, then the utilitarian advantages of punishing the occasional
innocent person would quickly diminish, and probably soon vanish
altogether.
The reason utilitarian policy makers are precluded from violating the
rights of the innocent, as a matter of policy, is that policies soon become
public knowledge. If nothing else, they are easily inferred from past
practices. Once news of such a policy gets out, people revise their
expectations in the light of it-in the case of criminal punishment, their
expectations of being punished even if not guilty. There are major
utilitarian payoffs to be had from sustaining certain sorts of expectations
and from avoiding others, Settled policies of one sort or another are
characteristically required to produce socially optimal effects in both
directions. That is one reason for utilitarian policymakers to abide by
settled policies, even when greater utility gains might be achieved in any
given instance by deviating from them.
Robert E. Goodin, Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy 70-71 (1995).
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maximize their own self-interests, predicts that officials
with the means to deceive the public will do so for their
own private interests rather than for the public interest.
Thus a utilitarian analysis of institutions disfavors a policy
of framing the innocent. Carritt's and McCloskey's
examples therefore do not prove that utilitarian penology
leads to unacceptable consequences. But they do show that
we should not apply an act-utilitarian morality to questions
of punishment. Utilitarian penology must rest on some
other ground:
We can make a similar point about retributivist
penology by considering the question of vigilante justice. If
retributive punishment rests on the obligations of
individuals to punish all and only those who deserve it,
then it would seem to condone some instances of lynching.
Suppose we are in a society that accepts capital
punishment as an appropriate punishment for the most
aggravated murders. Now, suppose a group of persons
have witnessed an atrocious crime, perhaps a multiple
murder. They have clearly identified the murderer and
satisfied themselves that he was conscious, sane, and fully
culpable for his act. They have disarmed and securely
captured the killer, who now poses no further threat.'
Moreover, let us assume the society we live in has a well-
administered impartial legal system that can be counted
upon to duly condemn and execute the murderer. Thus
there is no practical reason why the captors should not wait
until the constituted authorities arrive, and then hand the
offender over for legal proceedings. But why, from the
standpoint of deontological morality, must they? Suppose
instead they reason that the murderer deserves to be
killed, and that shifting responsibility for this unpleasant
task onto others would be cowardly. Suppose on this
reasoning, they simply kill him. In so doing, they will have
carried out the hypothesized moral duty to punish the
guilty.
Nevertheless, I think most of us would say that this
kind of gratuitous vigilante justice would be very wrong, an
act of murder. But why? Is it morally wrong? If so, how
2002] 327
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can it be morally right for state officials to execute the
criminal based on the same considerations? I think the
answer is that vigilante justice is not morally wrong, and
that legally authorized punishment of the guilty is not
morally right. The wrong of vigilante justice is a political
wrong and the right to punish conferred by law is a
political right. The offender in this case deserves
punishment, and the persons punishing him know he
deserves punishment. But they have not publicly
established that he deserves punishment. They have not
proven his guilt before any one who might seek to question
it, nor have they publicly established reasons why it is
necessary to punish-here to execute-one who is guilty of
this crime. Nor have they insured that anyone stands
ready to review their actions and to remedy their mistakes
or abuses. The problem with our hypothetical lynching is
not with the consequence that the murderer gets punished,
but with the institution doing the punishing. The defect is
not of morality, but of legitimacy.
The preceding examples reveal that neither utilitarian
nor deontological morality adequately accounts for our
intuitions about punishment, because these intuitions seem
to involve political as well as moral ideas. Thus we may
hypothesize scenarios in which a private person somehow
has absolutely reliable knowledge that a particular
punishment would be both utility-maximizing and
deserved, and still we may refuse to recognize such
punishment as politically legitimate. And, as McCloskey's
sheriff example suggests, the same might be true of
punishment by a public official. Judge Herbert Stern found
himself in such a situation in 1979, when he was sent to
occupied West Berlin to preside over a special court
convened to try some Polish hijackers of German ethnicity,
who had forced a Polish plane to land in West Berlin by
threatening the crew with a toy gun. West German
authorities were reluctant to prosecute these refugees from
communism, but the American executive was unwilling to
condone air piracy, no matter how benign the motives or
gentle the means. As a court of occupation, Judge Stern
328
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was obliged to apply local law. 0 But he was reluctant to do
so, given his position as a temporary, ad hoc court, whose
judgments would be executed by an occupation army rather
than a constitutionally organized, popularly representative,
and judicially supervised executive. At the sentencing of
one of the hijackers, Tiede, Judge Stern addressed U.S.
government lawyers saying,
Under these circumstances, who will be here to protect
Tiede if I give him to you for four years? Viewing the
constitution as nonexistent, considering yourselves not
restrained in any way, who will stand between you and
him? What Judge? What independent magistrate do you
have here? What independent magistrate will you permit
here? ... I sentence the defendant to time served. You...
are a free man right now."
Stern's position was neither that the hijackers did not
deserve punishment, nor that policymakers could not
reasonably conclude that social welfare demanded their
punishment. The difficulty was that there was no way to
ensure that they would be punished according to law.
Indeed, there were no policymakers prepared to take
responsibility for the decision that utility or desert
demanded the punishment of hijackers-not the Germans,
who were unwilling to prosecute, and not the Americans
who seemed unwilling to afford the defendants the
procedural protections of American law.'
One of Stern's controversial rulings was to extend to
the accused hijackers the American right of trial by jury,
which German law did not provide. By recruiting a panel
of Berliners to sit in judgment of Tiede, Stern arguably
10. Art. 64, Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, Concluded at Geneva, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
11. Herbert Stern, Judgment in Berlin 370 (1984) (quoted in Robert Cover,
Violence and the Word, 95 Yale L.J. 1620 (1986)).
12. This is a potentially serious defect in international criminal tribunals. See
generally Scott T. Johnson, On the Road to Disaster: The Rights of the Accused
and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 10 Int'l Legal
Persp. 111 (1998).
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rendered his court more politically responsive and
responsible. He ensured that the application of German
law would take some account of the sympathy for refugees
from communism that was widespread in Germany. The
German government had been reluctant to flout such
sympathy by prosecuting Tiede, and Stern ensured that
American prosecutors would also have to face
representatives of the German public. Stern intuited that
the German proscription of hijacking had, if not a different
meaning, then at least a different force, when applied by
Germans. Stern's action implied that legitimate
punishment requires not only the procedural check of an
independent court, but also the political check provided by
a democratic public.
The notion that punishment should be not only
morally deserved but also politically legitimate is reflected
in the American legal system's tolerance for jury
nullification. 13 Of course one function of jury nullification
is to provide an additional check against undeserved
punishment. Juries can resist proscriptions that infringe
liberty and punishments that are disproportionate, either
in general, or as applied to the particular case before them.
But jury nullification can also serve the quite different
function of checking procedural unfairness in the
formulation or administration of the laws.14 One example
of such nullification is provided by Paul Butler's
controversial suggestion that black jurors should refuse to
convict black men of drug crimes, even when they believe
them guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Butler does not
argue that such offenders do not deserve some punishment,
if guilty. Instead he proposes jury nullification as a
political protest against two features of the criminal justice
system. Butler's first target of protest is the persistence of
unfair discrimination against African-Americans in
decisions about whom to investigate, arrest, and prosecute,
13. See generally Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification Within the Rule of Law,
81 Minn. L. Rev., 1149 (1997).
14. See Gerald F. Uelmen, Perspective On Justice: Why Some Juries Judge
the System, L.A. Times, Jan. 24, 1996, § B.
330
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what behavior to criminalize, and how severely to punish
it. Butler's second target is our society's increasing
reliance on a social control strategy that focuses on
punitive sanctions rather than education and economic
opportunity. The combination of these two features
produces devastatingly high rates of incarceration among
young African-American males. 5  Butler argues that
African-Americans should not simply disagree with these
policies, they should regard them as illegitimate. They
should regard them as policies that, like slavery,
segregation, and disfranchisement, deny the full civic
status of African-Americans and so absolve them of any
political obligation to respect, or to participate in enforcing,
their country's laws. 6 This kind of challenge to the
legitimacy of criminal laws and procedures is invited, even
institutionalized, by the practice of tolerating jury
nullification. This particular device for enhancing political
legitimacy is, of course, a double-edged sword. Sometimes
nullification by jurors from one group erodes the legitimacy
of the criminal justice system among members of another
group, as in O.J. Simpson's murder trial, or the first trial of
Rodney King's assailants.
A similar conditioning of criminal justice on political
legitimacy is implied by the principle of legislativity,'7
found in many legal systems. The California Penal Code,
for example, prescribes that "No act or omission ... is
criminal or punishable, except as prescribed or authorized
by this code, or by some of the statutes which it specifies as
continuing in force ... or by some ordinance, municipal,
county or township regulation."' This requirement
15. John Kaplan, Robert Weisberg, & Guyora Binder, Criminal Law: Cases
and Materials 66 (2000).
16. Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the
Criminal Justice System, 105 Yale L.J. 677 (1995); see also Jeffirey Rosen, One
Angry Woman, New Yorker, Feb. 24/Mar. 3, 1997, at 54; Jeffrey Rosen, The
Bloods and the Crits, New Yorker, Dec. 9, 1997, at 27.
17. I use my colleague Markus Dubber's term "legislativity" in preference to
the more common, but less precise "legality," which includes the additional
requisites of prospectivity and specificity.
18. Cal. Penal Code § 6 (West 2001).
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ensures that conduct can only be criminalized by an
elected, representative body. When combined with
constitutional prohibitions on legislative bills of attainder,
it ensures that the body criminalizing conduct will not also
have the judicial power to impose or the executive power to
inflict punishment. Our system further separates the
power to punish by relying on an accusatorial procedure in
which the power to investigate and charge vests in elected
officers of the executive power rather than in the judiciary.
This separation of powers ensures that punishment can
only follow a number of independent authorizing decisions,
each an occasion for judging the legitimacy of decisions
farther upstream.
Yet another aspect of the American system which
suggests that moral obligations to punish are subordinate
to concerns about political legitimacy is our practice of
suppressing reliable, 19 but illegally obtained evidence. A
consequence of this practice is to acquit some defendants
who are clearly guilty, deserving of punishment, and a
threat to public safety. One purpose of suppressing
illegally obtained, but nevertheless reliable, evidence is to
deter illegal methods of investigation. Yet other
sanctions-fining or dismissing rogue investigators-could
accomplish this purpose at less cost in social protection and
deserved punishment. The practice of ignoring illegally
obtained reliable evidence in effect holds the court
responsible for the conduct of the police. It precludes the
judge from saying "I can conscientiously punish this guilty
offender, for I have done no wrong." This chain of
responsibility binds together the institutionally separate
processes of investigation and punishment imposition into
a single system. That system cannot legitimately punish
even the morally deserving offender unless it has respected
his civil rights at every stage.
19. Of course one reason to forbid some investigative methods is their general
unreliability: torture is apt to produce false confession. But when torture reveals
the location of physical evidence or incriminating knowledge of crime scene
details unavailable to the public, we are faced with a dilemma between condoning
torture and suppressing reliable evidence.
332
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In sum, it makes more sense to think of punishment as
a political institution than as a type of private act; and it
makes more sense to think of the justification of
punishment as a problem of political theory than as a
problem of ethics. But does this require junking our
received theories of punishment and starting fresh? Must
we desist from considering utility and desert when we
formulate the criminal law? Not at all. I will argue that
both utilitarianism and retributivism were originally
political theories concerned with the legitimacy of
punishment as an institution. Properly understood,
Bentham's utilitarianism was not a moral theory at all, but
a political theory, about democratically legitimate
lawmaking. Unlike Bentham, Kant was centrally
concerned with moral philosophy. But as a consequence, he
had much less to say about punishment, which he classified
as a problem of justice rather than morality. While Kant
required that just actions had to conform to moral
standards, he required more: he also held that the justice of
particular actions depends on their being authorized by
stable, effective, and, to the extent possible, democratic
legal institutions. Thus Kant's retributivism was also a
theory of legitimate lawmaking with a democratic
component. So it seems that both of our received theories
of punishment have a good deal to say about the requisites
of legitimate punishment and provide useful starting points
for developing a theory of punishment as a political
institution.
II. UTmITY AND LEGITIMACY
Let us first examine the political dimension of
utilitarian penology. The originators of utilitarian
penology were Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham. But
both derived their conception of utilitarianism chiefly from
Baron Helvetius. Helvetius was quite clear that his
utilitarianism had nothing to say about the moral duties of
individuals. Human behavior was driven by the rational
pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain, and so could only
20021 333
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be influenced by incentives rather than preaching.
Helvetius therefore concluded that the general happiness
was best pursued by establishing efficacious institutions
and generally applicable laws.
If morality hitherto has little contributed to the happiness
of mankind it is not owing to any want of perspicuity ... in
the moralists; but ... it must be owned, that they have not
often enough considered the different vices of nations as
necessarily resulting from the different form of their
government; yet it is only by considering morality in this
point of light, that it can be of any real use to men.2 °
For Helvetius, bad behavior resulted from bad
government. The proper subject of the moral philosopher
was therefore government, rather than ethics.
I say, that all men tend only toward their happiness; that it
is a iendency from which they cannot be diverted; that the
attempt would be fruitless, and even the success dangerous;
consequently, it is only by incorporating personal and
general interest, that they can be rendered virtuous. This
being granted, morality is evidently no more than a
frivolous science, unless blended with policy and legislation:
whence I conclude that, if philosophers would be of use to
the world, they should survey objects from the same point of
view as the legislator .... The moralist is to indicate the
laws, of which the legislator insures the execution, by
stamping them with the seal of his authority.2'
In their efforts to reform the criminal law, Beccaria
and Bentham adopted the perspective recommended by
Helvetius. They approached the subject from the
standpoint of the legislator, and they viewed criminal law
as an institution of government rather than a set of moral
norms. Beccaria's famous reformist tract, On Crimes and
Punishments began with a discussion of political theory,
20. Claude A. Helvetius, De L'Esprit, Or Essays on the Mind and its Several
Faculties 120 (Burt Franklin Research & Source Works Ser. 1970) (1761).
21. Id. at 124-25.
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inspired by Rousseau's Social Contract." Beccaria argued
that government was legitimate insofar as rationally
consented to, and rational persons .would consent only to so
much public coercion and injury as served their common
interests.2 While law should serve the common welfare,
"the greatest happiness of the greatest number,"
lawmakers inevitably served their own interests and
profited by the public's ignorance and misplaced trust.
24
Hence legitimate law could only arise from the will of an
enlightened general public, and the function of the
philosopher was to enlighten the public as to its own
interest.2 5 Beccaria used utility as the touchstone of policy
analysis, because it was a principle on which individuals of
differing views could rationally agree;26 hence it could
provide the basis for a social contract.
27
Beccaria argued that public coercion and injury served
the common interest only to the extent that they prevented
greater pivate coercion and injury. 8 It followed that
deterrence of crime was the only legitimate basis for
punishment, and then only where noncoercive measures
would not suffice. 29 And the most important noncoercive
crime control device was the "public tranquility" achieved
by establishing legitimate government. 30 Like Helvetius,
Beccaria assumed that citizens were by nature ruled by
passion and self-interest,31 and that all social achievement
proceeded from using legislation to harness or enable these
32energies.
Beccaria insisted that both laws and their enforcement
22. David Young, Introduction to Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and
Punishments xii (David Young trans., Hackett Pub. Co. 1986) (1764).
23. Beccaria supra note 22, at 5, 7, 8.
24. Id. at 5, 38.
25. Id. at 5.
26. Id. at 2.
27. Id. at 9.
28. Id. at 8.
29. Id. at 16, 79.
30. Id. at 22, 43.
31. Id. at 14, 75.
32. Id. at 41, 16.
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be public33 and regular.3 4 He reasoned that certain
punishment deterred more effectively than severe
punishment, for two reasons. First, certain punishment
did not allow the offender the hope of escaping punishment.
Second, both severity and discretion undermined
deterrence and security by delegitimizing the law. If laws
were too severe, citizens would refuse to cooperate with the
investigation, prosecution, and punishment of crimes.
Hence, the more severe punishments became, the less
certain, and so the less deterrent. Moreover, if the law
could be bent, citizens would seek advantage by turning
their energies to intrigue rather than productive
accomplishment. 6 Citizens would lose respect for law and
perhaps oppose it by force. Rulers would criminalize
dissent, causing unnecessary unhappiness and squelching
enlightenment, art, and science. Thus Beccaria was
profoundly wary of discretion in the administration of
justice.3 ' Beccaria accordingly insisted that justice was
public and so private forgiveness of crimes should play no
role in the administration of criminal law. In a well-
conceived regime of punishment, characterized by mildness
and regularity, pardons would also be unnecessary. 9
Thus Beccaria concluded that optimal deterrence of
crime depended on avoiding over-criminalization, on
certain but mild punishment, and above all on regularity of
its administration. But Beccaria's concerns transcended
optimal deterrence. His larger concern was with rational,
utility-maximizing governance. Here, governmental
rationality depended on popular enlightenment,4" popular
participation in lawmaking, and public scrutiny of the
administration of the laws.4' In sum, Beccaria's theory is a
33. Id. at 28, 81.
34. Id. at 81.
35. Id. at 46.
36. Id. at 75.
37. Id. at 51-52.
38. Id. at 10, 53.
39. Id. at 80.
40. Id. at 76.
41. Id. at 5.
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theory about the legitimate use of public coercive power,
rather than the private moral obligations of officials.
"[O]nly the law may decree punishments for crimes, and
this authority can rest only with the legislator, who
represents all of society united by a social contract."42
Officials are expected to openly serve utility as an
enlightened public defines it, by rigorously adhering to
rules.43 If they do so, an enlightened public will accept and
abide by the laws," the great aim of public security will be
achieved,45 the productive energies of society will be freed,
and public happiness will flourish.46
Utility plays two primary roles in this argument.
First, utility is a principle of psychology: thus elites,
potential offenders, and the wider public are presumed to
be bent on maximizing their self-interest.47 Elites are
presumed either to know their own self-interest or to profit
unwittingly from received arrangements. The general
public depends on philosophical enlightenment, for
knowledge of the public interest, however. Thus, the
second role for the idea of utility is evaluative and forensic.
In arguing to the general public for law reforms, the
philosopher should advert to the effect of the proposed
reforms on the general welfare. If a proposed reform serves
the public welfare, it may be rationally consented to. If
rationally consented to, it is legitimate. Thus the
normative significance of utility rests on a contractarian
theory of the legitimacy of laws, not on a general theory of
value, or a theory of moral obligation. There is no room for
officials to secretly pursue utility since this contributes
nothing to the legitimacy of government and risks
destroying it. "The right to inflict punishment does not
belong to an individual, but to all citizens, or the
42. Id. at 9.
43. Id. at 54.
44. Id. at 22.
45. Id. at 12.
46. Id. at 74-75.
47. Id. at 14, 75.
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sovereign." 8  Accordingly, officials charged with the
administration must be closely observed, to prevent their
betraying the public interest in favor of their own.49
It should be clear that Beccaria views punishment as a
governing institution, to be evaluated from the standpoint
of political legitimacy rather than morality. Because of his
institutional focus, Beccaria would be bound to frame the
problem of punishing the innocent in the same way that
Rawls did: as a question about the utility of an institution
like telishment. Because of his ultimate concern with
political legitimacy, Beccaria would be bound to ask
whether citizens would rationally agree to establish an
institution so insulated from popular scrutiny and control.
For Beccaria, utility is not an objective standard of value
capable of being deployed by anyone. Utility means the
welfare of a particular population, as it appears to them in
the context of public debate. It is a standard of value to be
deployed by a democratic public at large. Hence, when
officials employ utility as a standard, they may do so only
by the express delegation of this public decisionmaker, and
only within the limits set by that public. The utilitarian
standard of value, as it is developed by Beccaria,
presupposes a democratic decisionmaker and process of
decision.
The same was true of Bentham's utilitarianism,
although it was not built on a foundation of contractarian
political theory. Indeed, as I have elsewhere demonstrated,
Bentham did not build his policy science on any
philosophical foundation, and certainly not an ethical one."
Readers have been misled about the structure of Bentham's
utilitarianism by his statement in The Introduction to the
Principles of Morals and Legislation, that " [t]he principle of
utility is the foundation of the present work... .,,' Most
48. Id. at 55.
49. Id. at 78.
50. See generally Binder & Smith, supra note 7.
51. Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and
Legislation 11-12 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Cambridge U. Press 1996)
(1823) [hereinafter Bentham, Introduction].
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readers assume that this means that the greatest
happiness of the greatest number is Bentham's definition of
value and so provides the foundation for any normative
inquiry. But Bentham was not interested in philosophical
questions about the ultimate nature of the good. He was
interested in the question how to rationally settle political
disagreement and develop legitimate law. He regarded the
utility principle as a useful premise for political debate
about legislation because he thought everyone could agree
that other things being equal, it would be better to increase
rather than decrease the general welfare.
The utility principle is offered as the common ground
for political debate about legislation, rather than as a
foundation for ethics. Consider the book's opening
paragraph:
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two
sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone
to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine
what we shall do.... They govern us in all we do, in all we
say, in all we think. Every effort we can make to throw off
our subjection will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it.
In words a man may pretend to abjure their empire: but in
reality he will remain subject to it all the while. The
principle of utility recognizes this subjection, and assumes it
for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to
rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and law.
Systems which attempt to question it, deal in sounds
instead of sense, in caprice instead of reason, in darkness
instead of light.52
Bentham here reasons that individuals are self-
interested and can only be induced to be good by laws
offering rational incentives. Arguments supporting such
laws either rationally explain how such laws will gratify
the audience or they are empty cant, merely indicating that
such laws will gratify the speaker. When equated with
utility, "the words ought, and right and wrong, and others
52. Id. at 11.
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of that stamp, have a meaning: when otherwise, they have
none."5 This is not a claim about the nature of the good,
but about the nature of political discourse among self-
interested actors. As H.L.A Hart says of this passage,
it is ... intended to convey an idea which is central to his
whole argument, namely that when so used [the words
ought and right and wrong] raise a rationally settleable
issue because only then do they invoke an external standard
which reasonable men would accept for the determination of
right and wrong. 4
It is in this limited sense that the principle of utility
provides the foundation of Bentham's argument.
Bentham's argument is about good legislation. The
audience for such argument is necessarily a public
audience, and such an audience can only be rationally
persuaded by arguments about the consequences of laws
for the public welfare. And evaluation of acts according to
the public welfare is the meaning of the utility principle
when the actor one is trying to persuade is the public.
When the actor one is trying to persuade is an individual,
the principle of utility has the quite different meaning of
self-interest. Here is how Bentham draws the line between
the subjects of ethics and legislation:
Private ethics teaches how each man may dispose himself to
pursue the course most conducive to his own happiness, by
means of such motives as offer themselves: the art of
legislation (which may be considered as one branch of the
science of jurisprudence) teaches how a multitude of men,
composing a community, may be disposed to pursue that
course which upon the whole is most conducive to the
happiness of the whole community, by means of motives to
be applied by the legislator. 55
53. Id. at 13.
54. H.L.A. Hart, Bentham's Principle of Utility, in Bentham, Introduction,
supra note 51, at xc.
55. Id. at 293.
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In making sense of Bentham's principle of public
utility, it is important to remember its rhetorical function,
as the focus of a deliberative process of public discussion
and collective decision. Because the public utility principle
is merely a device for guiding the desired discursive
process, it is not an end in itself. Therefore, it cannot be
defined in ways that would undermine the conditions of
reasoned public discourse and rational collective
decisionmaking. In utilitarian political thought, process
values take precedence over substantive values.
Thus, Bentham defines public happiness in such a way
that it inherently requires certain institutional conditions.
For Bentham, the key feature that differentiates human
from animal experience is the ability to anticipate both
pleasure and pain. This trait is important to the
utilitarian picture of human beings as rational calculators
of future consequences. But when humans anticipate
future pleasure and pain they are not simply dispassionate
calculators. The expectation of pleasure is itself a pleasure,
and the expectation of pain is itself painful. Thus, when
anticipated, pain can be greatly magnified by the
apprehension that precedes it. Similarly, contentment can
be greatly magnified by a sense of security in its
continuation. Accordingly, the greatest portion of the
happiness humans seek is security.57  This concern for
security of expectations makes utilitarianism interested
not only in beneficial consequences, but in the stability of
the institutional means by which we might pursue these
consequences.
Accordingly, Bentham was less interested in
advocating particular policies as utility-maximizing than
he was in advocating a policy process that would guarantee
56. See Jeremy Bentham, Principles of the Civil Code, in 1 The Works of
Jeremy Bentham 308 (John Bowring ed., 1962).
57. Frederick Rosen, Jeremy Bentham and Representative Democracy: A
Study of the Constitutional Code 211-20 (1990) [hereinafter Rosen, Bentham and
Representative Democracy]; Frederick Rosen, Introduction, in Bentham,
Introduction, supra note 51, at xxxvi [hereinafter Rosen, Introduction]; Binder &
Smith, supra note 7, at 174-75.
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to the public that policy would systematically serve public
utility. This process required five interrelated institutional
conditions that, together would serve as "securities against
misrule:" (1) institutionalized investigation of social
conditions; (2) a transparent language of policy analysis
and legislation; (3) separation of legislative and
administrative functions; (4) publicity of government
decision-making; and (5) democratic election of legislators.
The first requisite of a utilitarian policy process is
information about social conditions and their effect on the
welfare of the society. Such information might be gathered
by public officials, pursuant to legislation, by legislative
commissions and hearings, or by scholars, journalists, and
publicists. 8  But if legislation is to be judged by its
expected contribution to the public welfare, it must be
framed in light of information about society. Once
implemented, legislation must be reevaluated based on its
actual effects. Bentham's concern with the gathering of
information is evident in his famous "Panopticon" proposal,
that prisons and other custodial institutions be designed as
laboratories for the observation and study of their
inmates. 9 Bentham imagined policy as a kind of controlled
experiment, in which both the interventions and the
observations of the investigators would be carefully
recorded and catalogued for future study. One difficulty
with the common view that utilitarianism obliges
individuals to act so as to maximize the public welfare is
that it leaves unexplained how individuals are expected to
know what actions will best serve the public welfare. Yet
individuals are likely to have limited information and their
perceptions of society are likely to be distorted by their own
interests." By contrast, utilitarianism envisions an
58. Jeremy Bentham, Constitutional Code, in 9 The Works of Jeremy
Bentham 41-46 (John Bowring, ed. 1962) [hereinafter Bentham, Constitutional
Code]; T.P. Peardon, Bentham's Ideal Republic, in 3 Jeremy Bentham: Critical
Assessments 621, 641 (Bikhu Parekh ed., 1993); Rosen, Bentham and
Representative Democracy, supra note 57, at 27 n.50.
59. Jeremy Bentham, Panopticon; Or, the Inspection-House, in 4 The Works of
Jeremy Bentham 37-172 (John Bowring ed., 1962).
60. See generally Russell Hardin, Morality Within the Limits of Reason
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institutionally organized collective process of gathering
information and subjecting it to expert analysis and public
deliberation.6 1 This process culminates in the promulgation
of generally applicable conduct rules, rather in individual
decisions about how to act.
Thus, a second requisite of utilitarian policymaking is
the rational and impartial analysis of the information
gathered. This required a certain kind of language of
policy analysis.2  Such a language should be as
dispassionate and value-free as possible. While Bentham
bet on the widespread normative appeal of collective
happiness, he assumed that values were ultimately
subjective and that there was no point in debating them. A
useful language of policy analysis should therefore avoid
evaluative terminology, should clearly identify publicly
observable facts and should always attribute value
judgments to particular persons. The concept of utility
itself was an effort to replace vague, hortatory evaluative
claims with descriptive claims about the hedonic states of
particular persons. Bentham complained that much
moral philosophy was obfuscatory cant, that persuaded
through emotional appeal rather than reasoned argument.
He also argued that most reformers had an incentive to
disguise the true failures of prevailing policy. Given
human nature, prevailing policy was likely to benefit only
those in a position to make law. Reformers were likely to
be persons interested in replacing current lawmakers so as
to benefit from prevailing or similar policy. Their interest
lay in deceiving the public into -thinking that permitting
them to make law would benefit the public.64 Bentham
devoted considerable energy to developing and defining
new terms to use in utilitarian policy analysis, so as to
permit a clear comparison of the costs and benefits of
(1988).
61. See generally L.J. Hume, Bentham and Bureaucracy (1981).
62. Binder & Smith, supra note 7, at 176-84.
63. Id. 184; Bentham, Introduction, supra note 51, at 26-28.
64. Bentham, Constitutional Code, supra note 58, at 44.
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alternative policies.65 An important purpose of developing
a uniform and clear language of policy analysis was to
permit the public to assess the impact of policies on its own
interests. This in turn would enable the public to make
rational choices of policies and of elected representatives.
In other words, Bentham's project of reforming the
language of political debate presupposed a role for the
democratic public in assessing and influencing policy.
Utilitarianism was in this sense a project of public
enlightenment, aimed at educating the public politically, so
as to qualify it for its new role of political participation in
the emergent democratic state.
If the pursuit of the public welfare required a clear
language of policy analysis, it also required a clear
language of legislation.66 It was important that legislation
be clear to at least four different audiences. The meaning
of legislation needs to be clear to legislators, scholars, and
publicists, so they can study and analyze its likely effects.
The meaning of legislation must be clear to members of the
public so that they can evaluate it, express their opinion of
it, and vote for or against legislators who propose or enact
it. The effect and import of legislation also must be clear to
those subject to it so that they can understand what
conduct it demands of them and what positive and negative
incentives it provides. Finally, it must be clear to officials
charged with implementing it, so they have no occasion to
exercise legislative discretion. If the meaning of the law is
clear to the public, it should also be possible for the public
to monitor official compliance with law, and so to identify
illicit exercises of political discretion by officials. In order
to render the law clear and accessible to all these
audiences, it was necessary that it be codified, so that gaps,
redundancies and conflicts could be identified and
eliminated. It was also necessary that all important terms
be defined and used consistently within and across codes.
Bentham pursued this program by criticizing the legal
65. Binder & Smith, supra note 7, at 183-84.
66. Id. at 182-86.
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terminology of the common law as obfuscatory and by
developing and defining terms of his own for use in his
model codes.
Bentham opposed discretion in the application of law
because of another requisite for a properly utilitarian policy
process: the separation of legislative from judicial and
executive functions. Bentham sought to isolate the
exercise of policymaking authority in one body so as to
render it visible and responsive to the public. This
required that law be enacted by the legislature only: there
could be no customary or common law .6  Laws needed to be
precise and detailed so as to minimize opportunities for
judicial construction or administrative discretion. 9
Bentham proposed that official application of the law be
monitored and that misapplication of law be punished.
Thus, for Bentham, separation of powers was a means to
legislative supremacy. Legislative supremacy, in turn,
insured that law would be made in the form of general
rules.
Bentham's insistence on a legislative monopoly on
policymaking fits with two other "securities" against
misrule: publicity and democracy. The reason to locate
policymaking authority in one place was to permit public
monitoring of policymaking. The reason to locate it in an
elected, representative legislature was to insure that policy
would respond to popular will.
Publicity was essential to this system.70  Bentham
67. Id. at 184-89.
68. John R. Dinwiddy, Bentham 64 (1989); Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of
Judicial Evidence, in 7 Works of Jeremy Bentham 1, 122 (John Bowring ed.,
1962).
69. Jeremy Bentham, Constitutional Code, supra note 58, at 383-417; Jeremy
Bentham, Securities Against Misrule and Other Writings for Tripoli and Greece
42, 252 (Philip Schofield ed., 1990) [hereinafter Bentham, Securities Against
Misrule]; G.J. Postema, The Principle of Utility and the Law of Procedure:
Bentham's Theory of Adjudication, in 3 Jeremy Bentham: Critical Assessments,
supra note 58, at 308, 316; L.J. Hume, Jeremy Bentham and the 19th Century
Revolution in Government, in id. at 829, 825; Frederick Rosen, Jeremy Bentham
and Constitutional Democracy: A Study of the Constitutional Code 65, 86 (1983).
70. Binder & Smith, supra note 7, at 200-08; Bentham, Securities Against
Misrule, supra note 69, at 25-28; Dinwiddy, supra note 68, at 89.
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insisted that every government action be duly recorded,
along with the reasons for which it was taken and the
evidence relied on. All government proceedings, including
every stage of the criminal justice process, should be open
to the public and reported in the press.71  Bentham
reasoned that the combination of institutionalized public
observation of government proceedings and a free press
would create an informed public. He referred to such an
informed public as "the Public Opinion Tribunal," and
considered it a crucial feature of a legitimate constitutional
order." The effectiveness of public inspection of
government depended, however, on clearly delineated
government functions and the use by government officials
of a clear and common language for reporting and
justifying government action. Bentham reasoned that
government officials would surely pursue their own
interests rather than the public interest, unless they were
checked by the threat of removal by the public and unless
that threat was rendered effective by public monitoring.
But effective public monitoring of government action
had another advantage as well. Not only would it force
officials to pursue the public welfare, as the public
understood it; it would also reassure the public that
officials were pursuing the public's understanding of its
welfare and that they were constrained to do so. In other
words, an open, transparent process of policymaking was
crucial to providing the public with the sense of security
that Bentham regarded as the greater part of happiness.
The threat of removal of legislators and other public
officials from office required democratic election of
legislators, to whom all government officials were, in turn,
subordinate.73  Bentham was initially suspicious of
democracy, because of his disapproval of the natural rights
language by which it was justified in the rhetoric of the
71. Bentham, Securities Against Misrule, supra note 69, at 11, 50.
72. Id. at 28, 57-61; Bentham, Constitutional Code, supra note 58, at 41-46;
Frederick Rosen, Jeremy Bentham and Representative Democracy supra note 57,
at 27.
73. Binder & Smith, supra note 7, at 189-200.
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American revolution. But his views on democracy warmed
as he experienced frustration in winning the support of
British leaders for his proposed codes. He also became very
impressed with America's constitutional arrangements.74
Although in many ways an elitist, who thought the
legitimacy of policy depended on its rationality rather than
its popularity, Bentham became convinced that elites could
not be trusted to serve the public welfare unless they were
tethered to popular will. And while the public might be
deceived about its interests in the short run, public
judgment would improve with political experience. In an
open process of discussion, a roughly correct understanding
of the public interest would eventually prevail.7 But even
if the policy developed through a democratic political
process was not the most efficacious possible, utilitarianism
would nevertheless demand such a process. Again, only
democratic checks on government action could reassure the
public that policy was not being hijacked by private
interest. Only such checks could secure the public against
concerted attacks on the public welfare by tyrants.
Bentham is commonly understood to have simply
proposed an ethical criterion, an evaluative principle to be
applied by every actor in making every decision. In fact, he
did nothing of the sort. What he instead proposed was a
complex institutional process for making and implementing
policy. Part of that institutional process was a unifyrm
discourse of policy analysis. The utility principle was
central to that policy discourse, but it was not prior to or
more fundamental than the institutions necessary to
render such a policy discourse a useful instrument of the
74. Bentham, Constitutional Code, supra note 58, at 63; Bentham, Plan of
Parliamentary Reform, in 3 The Works of Jeremy Bentham 433, 447, 494 (John
Bowring ed., 1962); Jeremy Bentham, The King Against Edmonds and Others, in
2 The Works of Jeremy Bentham 239, 246 (John Bowring ed., 1962); H.LA Hart,
Essays on Bentham, 101 (1982); Frederick Rosen, Introduction, supra note 57, at
xlvi; Elie Halevy, The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism 254-56 (Mary Morris
trans., 1966); M.H. James, Bentham's Democratic Theory at the Time of the
French Revolution, 10 The Bentham Newsletter 5-16 (1986).
75. Binder & Smith, supra note 7, at 199-200; Jeremy Bentham, 1
Constitutional Code 36 (F. Rosen & J.H. Burns eds., 1983).
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public welfare. Utilitarianism does not instruct individuals
to maximize utility. Maximizing utility is exclusively the
job of a democratically controlled, publicly monitored
legislature, in its role of enacting clear, stable, legal rules of
general application. What utilitarianism demands of the
individual is merely that she help realize utility by
supporting utilitarian institutions, by making available
information about local social conditions and her own
preferences, by monitoring government, and by informing
herself about public issues before casting a vote.
This revised understanding of utilitarianism as a
democratically controlled policy process does not by itself
imply very definite prescriptions with regard to criminal
justice. But it does imply that, contrary to prevailing
perceptions, utilitarian criminal justice will be highly
formalistic, consistent, transparent, and procedurally
scrupulous. Accordingly, it rules out some common
misunderstandings of the implications of utilitarianism.
Thus, it disposes of the oft-repeated objections of
McCloskey and Carritt.6  Properly understood as an
institutional process rather than an ethical doctrine,
utilitarianism neither compels nor authorizes individuals
to punish the innocent. A practice of punishing the
innocent could only enhance deterrence if it involved
misleading the public into believing the persons punished
were guilty. For the reasons that Goodin and Rawls
develop, public awareness that officials were pursuing such
a policy of framing the innocent would destroy the security
that it is the aim of utilitarianism to achieve. And for such
a policy to be developed and maintained without public
knowledge would require institutional conditions
completely inconsistent with such security. Bentham's key
securities against misrule-legislative supremacy,
publicity, and democratic accountability-would preclude
any policy involving the systematic deception of the public.
Still, one might argue that the goal of maximizing the
public welfare might, from a moral point of view, justify an
76. Binder & Smith, supra note 7, at 188, 208-09, 212.
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individual official or witness in framing an innocent
person. The rejoinder is that such a moral view does not
follow from utilitarianism, which was a theory about how
to design institutions so as to secure the procedural
conditions for identifying and collectively pursuing the
public welfare, by means of law.7
The received understanding and critique of utilitarian
penology presumes that "utility," or the public welfare, is
just there, available to be inspected and maximized by any
well-meaning moral agent. Generations of political and
economic theorists have raised questions about the notion
that group preferences can be treated as independent of the
institutions by which they are measured and defined. And
some have even doubted that individual preferences can be
viewed as independent of the institutions that measure and
aggregate them into collective preferences.78 Thus, the
conception of the public welfare that critics ascribe to
utilitarianism is not one that many contemporary political
or economic theorists hold. What these critics fail to realize
is that Bentham himself had a more complicated
conception of the public welfare. While he probably thought
of "private utility" as fairly straightforward fact about
subjective states, he though of the "public utility" that was
to guide legislation as an institutional construct. Public
utility was the product of an institutionally organized and
regulated discursive process of social research and policy
analysis. The utilitarian imperative is not for individuals
to maximize the aggregate happiness of society as they see
it. The utilitarian imperative is for polities to realize the
institutional conditions for public utility.
77. Id. at 210-11.
78. Jane J. Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary Democracy (1980); Kenneth
Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (1963); Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth
Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice, Value Pluralism, and
Democratic Politics, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 2121 (1990); Stephen Holmes, Passions
and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy (1995).
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III. RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND LEGITIMACY
Contemporary retributivism traces its lineage to
Kant,79 who discussed punishment briefly in the course of
laying out his theory of justice in the first half of The
Metaphysics of Morals. ° For Kant, just actions are a
subset of moral actions, so that legitimate punishment
must satisfy the dictates of both morality and justice.
Thus, clarifying Kant's rather hazy statements on
punishment requires explicating his conceptions of
morality and justice.
For Kant, moral action is action undertaken because of
a belief that it is required by a principle that can be
coherently seen as binding on everyone."' Examples of
principles that Kant would have considered contradictory
when universalized are the following:
Take whatever you want to have.
Tell others whatever you wish them to believe.
For Kant, these principles are self-contradictory when
universalized, because they are self-defeating. Thus, if
everyone takes whatever she wants, no one will be able to
keep and have what she takes. 2 And if everyone routinely
says what she wishes others to believe rather than what
she actually believes, what people say is true will have no
probative value. It will simply be taken as evidence of
what the speaker wishes the hearer to believe, rather than
as evidence of what is true. Thus it would become
impossible to induce otliers to believe something is true
79. Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 The Monist 475 (1968); see
also e.g., Jeffrie G. Murphy, Three Mistakes About Retributivism, 31 Analysis
166, 166-69 (1971); Andrew Von Hirsch, Doing Justice 47-48 (1976).
80. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (Mary Gregor trans.,
Cambridge U. Press 1991) (1785).
81. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 15, 31 (Mary
Gregor trans., Cambridge U. Press 1998) (1797) [hereinafter Kant, Groundwork].
82. Immanuel Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Justice 139 (2d ed. John Ladd
trans., Hackett Pub. Co. 1999) (1796) [hereinafter Kant, Metaphysical Elements].
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merely by saying it is.3 Kant therefore concludes that
stealing undermines the institution of property, lying
undermines the institution of truth telling, and bad faith
undermines the institution of promising. In all these cases,
the principle of exploiting a cooperative institution to gain
an unfair share of the benefits created by that institution is
rejected as contradictory because, if universalized, it would
destroy the institution and thereby preclude the very
benefit sought.'
Kant further refines his test of morality by treating
morality itself as such a cooperative institution. A moral
action must not only conform to a universalizable principle:
it also be undertaken because of a universalizable
principle.85 This implies that a moral action may not be
done because of inclination (the present desire so to act) or
interests (the hope of bringing about later consequences
desirable to one's self or another). If a moral action may
not be taken because of inclination or self-interest, it
follows that it may not be taken because of a coercive
threat, which merely creates a motive of self-interest. So to
act morally requires a capacity to resist inclination, to
reason out one's moral obligations (using the
universalization test), and to make an uncoerced choice to
act according to the resulting moral judgment. It follows
that to act morally is always to. act on the basis of two
principles: the universalizable principle identified by one's
moral judgment, and the metaprinciple that one should
freely act on the basis of one's moral judgment.
Universalized, this metaprinciple becomes the rule that all
persons should act according to their own moral judgments.
But doing so requires that they be permitted the
opportunity to develop their own moral views and to choose
to act on them-or not-without coercion. It follows that
no moral principle passes the universalization test unless it
is compatible with the exercise of autonomy by all others.
Morality therefore requires not only fair cooperation with
83. Kant, Groundwork, supra note 81, at 15, 32.
84. Ralph Walker, Kant and the Moral Law 36 (1999).
85. Kant, Groundwork, supra note 81, at 36.
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others, but also equal respect for the autonomy of all
others.86 Respecting this autonomy requires granting to
others the same freedom to develop into rational moral
agents that engenders one's own moral agency. It also
requires according others equal freedom to pursue the
nonmoral ends that constitute self-interest, because one
cannot choose to act on moral ends without the freedom to
act on nonmoral ends.8 7
Kant's principle of equal autonomy generates
difficulties, however, in that if individuals are completely
free to act as they choose, they will infringe one another's
freedom."' Thus, the efforts of all to act autonomously are
incompatible unless they all freely choose to act morally. 9
And they cannot be constrained to act morally, because
action cannot be moral unless it is freely willed.
The inevitable conflict of freely willed actions explains
the necessity of law, or collective coercion; the tension
between law and the moral autonomy of those subject to it
frames the problem of justice, or legitimate coercion. In
order to protect the autonomy of its members, society must
coerce its members to behave according to the dictates of
morality, but thereby appears to deprive them of their
autonomy and so of any opportunity to act morally. Kant's
solution to this paradox is a social contract, modeled on
Rousseau's, in which society's members freely subject
themselves to law." Having consented to the imposition of
legal coercion, they can follow the dictates of the law and
still act morally. They can also coerce one another through
the medium of the state in a way that they cannot do as
individuals, because the state represents the will of those
86. Kant, Metaphysical Elements, supra note 82, at 38; Allen Rosen, Kant's
Theory of Justice 64-65 (1965).
87. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Kant: The Philosophy of Right 93, 95, 101 (1970).
88. Rosen, supra note 86, at 16. This problem is thoroughly ventilated in
Joseph Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from
Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. Rev. 975.
89. The condition of universal freedom reconciled by free submission to the
moral law is Kant's "Kingdom of Ends." See Walker, supra note 84, at 41; Barbara
Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment 85, 227 (1993).




Since an effective legal system is necessary to protect
one's own and others' autonomy, the exercise of morally
autonomous choice implies a moral obligation to subject
one's self to law.92 Moreover, law's interference with
autonomy is limited. Where morality regulates intentional
states or internal acts of will, law governs only external
conduct.93 It does not require individuals to act out of
moral motives, but simply to conform their conduct to
universalizable and so moral principles of action. In
essence, law forces individuals to comply with rather than
exploit cooperative institutions.
Punishment is legal coercion, threatened and inflicted
because of the morally culpable violation of a conduct norm.
By coercion, Kant means a sanction that effectively
deprives an actor of the advantage she hoped to gain by
violating a cooperative norm of morality. In this way it not
only deters others from violating the norm, it frustrates the
criminal's selfish purpose in violating the norm. By
frustrating the criminal's purposes, punishment
represents, in the criminal's own experience, the
contradiction that would arise from universalizing the
criminal's principle of action. Here is how Kant explains
the meaning of imprisoning a thief:
Inasmuch as someone steals, he makes the property of
everyone else insecure, and hence he robs himself (in
accordance with the law of retribution) of the security of any
possible property. He has nothing and can also acquire
nothing, but he still wants to live, and this is not possible
unless others provide him with nourishment. But because
the state will not support him gratis, he must let the state
have his labor at any kind of work it may wish to use him
for (convict labor), and so he becomes a slave, either for a
91. Id. at 62; Murphy, supra note 87, at 108.
92. Rosen, supra note 86, at 10.
93. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, supra note 80, at 56; Rosen, supra note
86, at 89-90.
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certain period of time, or indefinitely, as the case may be.94
Kant holds that a threatened sanction does not count
as punishment unless if actually has a coercive effect in
one of the two senses discussed above. That is, it must
actually frustrate the immoral purposes of those on whom
it is imposed, or its threat must deter some persons from
committing the crime. Kant apparently did not consider
whether the probability of punishment must be so great as
to deter any rational person from committing the crime.
But he did seem to think of punishment as inherently
deterrent. Kant revealed this aspect of his conception of
punishment in a discussion of the doctrine of necessity.
Kant posed the hypothetical of two shipwrecked sailors
adrift in the ocean, struggling over a plank large enough to
support only one of them. He concluded that neither one is
justified in pushing the other off, to his death, because such
a principle of action, if universalized, would be self-
defeating. But he also concluded that it is impossible to
punish such a killer, because the threat of later
punishment could not possibly deter the killing, since its
execution would not wholly deprive the survivor of the
advantage he would gain by killing his competitor.
This imagined right [of necessity] is supposed to authorize
me to take the life of another person when my own life is in
danger, even if he has done me no harm. It is quite obvious
that this conception implies a self-contradiction within
jurisprudence.... It is clear that this allegation is not to be
understood objectively, according to what a law might
prescribe, but merely subjectively, as the sentence might be
pronounced in a court of law. There could be no penal law
assigning the death penalty to a person who has been
shipwrecked and finds himself struggling-both of them in
equal danger of losing their lives-and in order to save his
own life pushes the other person off the plank on which he
had saved himself. For no threatened punishment from the
law could be greater than losing his life in the first instance.
94. Kant, Metaphysical Elements, supra note 82, at 139.
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Now a penal law applied to such a situation could never
have the effect intended, for the threat of an evil that is still
uncertain (being condemned to death by a judge) cannot
outweigh the effect of an evil that is certain (being
drowned). Hence, we must judge that, although an act of
self-preservation through violence is not inculpable, it still
is unpunishable. .. .95
Kant's claim here is not that such punishment would
be pointless or wasteful or cruel, but that it would not even
be punishment at all. The threatened harm must exceed
the expected benefits of the crime, or the actual harm must
exceed the actual benefits of the crime, for either to count
as coercive, in Kant's sense. Both imposing a conditional
threat and forcibly depriving someone of a sought after
benefit are ways of interfering with their autonomous
choice. In its coercive effect we may analogize punishment
to coercive offenses like robbery, or rape, which may violate
consent by either force or the threat of force.
It may seem surprising that Kant's conception of
punishment presumes its deterrent effect, since he is often
thought to be indifferent to consequences. Certainly, he
professed to consider consequences morally irrelevant.
Thus, in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, he
inveighs that "the moral worth of an action does not lie in
the effect expected from it and so too does not lie in any
principle of action that needs to borrow its motive from this
expected effect."96 On the other hand, he acknowledged in
other passages that morality aims at ends: for example,
morality requires us to treat each human being as an end
by according her as much freedom as is compatible with
our own.9 But even if consequences were irrelevant to the
morality of an act, this would not entail that consequences
were irrelevant to justice, which is a different standard of
value. And justice, rather than morality, is the standard
95. Id. at 35-36.
96. Kant, Groundwork, supra note 81, at 14.
97. Walker, supra note 84, at 8-9. For a general argument that Kant's moral
theory only makes sense as a partly consequentialist method of practical
judgment, see Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment 73-112 (1993).
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Kant proposes for assessing punishment.
So what does Kant have to say about the consequences
of punishment? Here his views are more complex than is
commonly recognized, in that he rejects only certain kinds
of consequences as irrelevant to justice. In a widely quoted
and colorful passage, he objected to what he imagined to be
the implications of utilitarianism for punishment:
Judicial punishment can never be used merely as a means
to promote some other good for the criminal himself or for
civil society, but instead it must in all cases be imposed on
him only on the ground that he has committed a crime; for a
human being can never be manipulated merely as a means
to the purposes of someone else and can never be included
among objects of the law of things. His innate Personality
protects him against such treatment, even though he may
indeed by condemned to forfeit his civil Personality. He
must first be found deserving of punishment before any
consideration is given to the utility of this punishment for
himself or for his fellow citizens. The law concerning
punishment is a categorical imperative, and woe to him who
rummages around in the winding paths of a theory of
happiness looking for some advantage to be gained by
releasing the criminal from punishment or by reducing the
amount of it.... If legal justice perishes, then it is no
longer worthwhile for humans to remain alive on this earth.
If this is so, what should one think of the proposal to permit
a criminal who has been condemned to death to remain
alive, if, after consenting to allow dangerous experiments to
be made on him, he happily survives such experiments and
if doctors thereby obtain new information that benefits the
community? Any court of justice would turn down such a
proposal with scorn ... for justice ceases to be justice if it
can be bought for a price."
A slightly later passage, however qualifies this
seeming rejection of consequentialism:
Anyone who is a murderer-that is, has committed a
98. Kant, Metaphysical Elements, supra note 82, at 138.
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murder, commanded one, or taken part in one-must suffer
death. This is what justice as the Idea of judicial authority
wills in accordance with universal laws that are grounded a
priori. The number of accomplices in such a deed might,
however, be so large that the state would soon approach the
condition of having no more subjects if it were to rid itself of
these criminals, and this would lead to its dissolution and a
return to the state of nature, which is much worse, because
it would be a state of affairs without any external legal
justice whatsoever. Since a sovereign will want to avoid
such consequences and above all, will want to avoid
adversely affecting the feelings of the people by the
spectacle of such butchery, he must have it within his power
in case of necessity to assume the role of judge and to
pronounce a judgment that, instead of imposing the death
penalty on the criminals, assigns some other punishment
that will make the preservation of the mass of the people
possible, such as, for example, deportation. Such a course of
action would not come under a public law, but would be an
executive decree, that is, an act based on the right of
majesty, which, as an act of reprieve, can be exercised only
in individual cases. 9
How can we reconcile these seemingly contradictory
statements about consequentialism? We must distinguish
among different types of consequentialism The type of
consequentialism that Kant regards as irrelevant to
punishment is hedonism, or the "theory of happiness."
Generally speaking, happiness is not an ultimate, but only
a contingent value, for Kant. What makes us happy
depends on our interests and inclinations, but it is the
nature of a moral agent to choose her ends, not to accept its
own desires uncritically.10 Thus Kant is more interested in
securing the conditions for persons to freely choose their
ends than he is in insuring their happiness. And to the
extent that morality requires us to seek the happiness of
others, it is in order to affirm their equal worth as choosers
of their own ends, not because happiness is an intrinsic
99. Id. at 141.
100. Kant, Groundwork, supra note 81, at 36.
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good. 101 So Kant does not reject consequentialism, but in
evaluating consequences, he completely prioritizes the
goods of justice and autonomy over the good of happiness. 2
In the context of punishment, it is impossible to avoid
considerations of happiness since, as we have seen, a penal
sanction must, by definition, threaten to make the
defendant worse off as a consequence of committing the
crime. But Kant wants to avoid calculating the
unhappiness of the person punished as a cost, since he
conceives of that unhappiness as the frustration of an
immoral desire to violate the autonomy of others. If a
society allows the criminal to enjoy the benefits of his
crime, it becomes an accomplice. Perhaps Kant also wishes
to avoid the notion that punishment is a sort of therapeutic
benefit. This idea might tempt us to coercively impose
therapeutic treatment on those who have not consented to
it and who have not yet earned coercive treatment by
actually violating the law.
While society may not trade justice to achieve the end
of happiness, it may apparently trade justice for justice.
Thus, it may mitigate deserved punishment in order to
preserve the legal order on which justice depends. This is
exactly the choice that many societies have recently faced
in trying to transform themselves from dictatorships into
democracies. Dictatorial regimes often maintain
themselves by systematizing atrocity, a practice that may
render a very large proportion of the population complicit
in crimes. Unless the bulk of these accomplices are
amnestied, it may be impossible to win the population's
assent to a just regime of prospective laws.11 3  Kant so
prioritized the authority of the legal order that he objected
categorically to the trial of overthrown tyrants, on the
101. Walker, supra note 84, at 12-13.
102. Murphy, supra note 87, at 106-07.
103. For general discussions of this problem, see Pablo De Greiff, Trial and
Punishment, Pardon and Oblivion: On Two Inadequate Policies for the Treatment
of Former Human Rights Abusers, 22 Phil. & Soc. Criticism 93 (1996); Bruce A.




grounds that all of their unjust actions were lawful at the
time committed."°4 Society faces a more prosaic dilemma
between competing claims of justice when it tries to induce
underlings in a criminal organization to cooperate in
providing evidence against their leaders. A measure of
justice may have to be sacrificed in order that any justice
may be done. Kant seems to accept this kind of trade off in
the quoted passage about pardoning accomplices.
So when it comes to the important value of autonomy,
Kant is willing to be very practical. The exercise of
autonomy realistically depends upon the rule of law,
preferably the rule of just law. Because the rule of law is
merely a means to autonomy, it is more important to
ensure its future survival than to insist on its retrospective
vindication. Yet, Kant insists, while current justice may
have to be compromised to insure the survival of just
institutions, the decision to do so lies outside of those
institutions. So Kant was a consequentialist about law, but
apparently believed that consequentialism had no place
within law.
Kant's insistence on the regularity and consistency of
law as such, flows from his conception of law as an
institution that actually universalizes principles of action.
This is one of the differences between morality and justice.
An act is moral if it is undertaken because of a principle of
action that can be universalized, even if it is the only such
act ever performed. An actor of bad character can still
perform a moral act, because an act can be moral in
isolation from other acts. By contrast, an act cannot be just
in isolation, because justice is a value that inheres in
regularity and systematicity. As Jeffrie Murphy explains,
[i]t is a necessary truth about the institutional rules
prescribing punishment, and not merely a moral
observation about them, that they should be justly
enforced-that like cases be treated alike. For only in this
way can law attain its primary social function: the control of
social behavior through rules.... These rules can perform
104. Kant, Metaphysical Elements, supra note 82, at 128.
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their socials function only if coupled with a justly enforced
system of authoritative punishment."'
That death is a fit penalty for murder (as Kant
believed) does not make the execution of, say, only black
murderers just, if equally guilty whites are spared."°6 This
is why Kant could not have regarded even deserved
punishment as just, if meted out on an ad hoc basis by
vigilantes." 7  This requirement of regularity in the
imposition of punishment helps us to resolve the puzzle
raised earlier about the extent to which Kant required that
punishment actually deter. To count as just, punishment
must be successfully inflicted in response to every crime,
and must always deprive the criminal entirely of the
benefit of the crime. This means that, by definition, a just
regime of punishment always suffices to deter a rational
actor. In this way, just punishment ideally deters criminal
acts and effectually protects the equal autonomy of
potential victims. Just coercion depends on stable, regular
legal institutions, which render spheres of autonomous
choice real, by reliably protecting them.'
Thus far, we have seen that to qualify as just,
punishment must be imposed by law because of the freely
chosen violation of a morally obligatory norm of conduct.
Such punishment must be imposed systematically and
equally on all similarly situated actors. The punishment
must be proportionate to the crime-harsh enough to
deprive the criminal of the benefit of the crime, but no
harsher than the evil inflicted by the crime. 109 There is, in
105. Murphy, supra note 87, at 117.
106. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (arbitrary and capricious
capital sentencing scheme risks racial discrimination); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279 (1987) (dismissing challenge to capital sentencing scheme based on
statistical evidence of discrimination on the basis of race of the victim).
107. Murphy, supra note 87, at 117.
108. Rosen, supra note 86, at 89-91.
109. Kant, Metaphysical Elements, supra note 82, at 172.
The only time a criminal cannot complain that he is treated unjustly is
when he draws the evil deed back onto himself, and when he suffers that
which according to the spirit of the penal law-even if not to the letter
thereof-is the same as what he has inflicted on others.
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addition to these conditions, one more requisite of just
punishment. In order for coercion to be just, the person
suffering coercion must have consented to the law imposing
it. This requirement of consent follows from the moral
principle that every person should be treated equally, as an
end-that is, as an autonomous person who cannot be
coerced in her moral choices." 0  However, such a
requirement raises the difficulty that citizens do not
personally consent to any laws. Kant's solution to this
problem is to substitute the collective consent of
majoritarian democracy for personal consent:
The legislative authority can be attributed only to the
united Will of the people. Since all of justice is supposed to
proceed from this authority, it can do absolutely no injustice
to anyone. Now, when someone orders something against
another, it is always possible that he thereby does another
an injustice, but this is never possible with respect to what
one decides for oneself (for volenti non fit injuria). Hence,
only the united and consenting Will of all-that is, a general
united Will of the people by which each decides the same for
all and all decide the same for each-can legislate. The
members of such a society (societas civilis), that is, of a
state, who are united for the purpose of making laws are
called citizens (cives). There are three juridical attributes
inseparably bound up with the nature of a citizen as such:
first, the lawful freedom to obey no law other than that to
which he has given his consent; second, the civil equality of
having among the people no superior over him except
another person whom he has just as much of a moral
capacity to bind juridically as the other to bind him; third,
the attribute of civil self-sufficiency that requires that he
owe his existence and support, not to the arbitrary will of
another person in the society, but rather to his own rights
and powers as a member of the commonwealth .... 1
Of course the collective consent of the citizenry seems
imperfect in several ways. First, and most obviously, the
110. Rosen, supra note 86, at 14, 56-57, 62-63.
111. Kant, Metaphysical Elements, supra note 82, at 119, 120.
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result of an election is preferred only by those in the
majority. A majoritarian process of decision does not yield
consensus. Second, in a large and complex society, citizens
cannot be expected to inform themselves about and
personally vote on every law. As a result, Kant proposed a
representative democracy, in which voters would only
exercise consent vicariously, through representatives, who
cannot possibly follow the inevitably inconsistent wishes of
all of their supporters on each and every issue. Third,
potential voters are not always in a position to choose
autonomously. Kant recognized the impingement of
circumstance on consent by limiting the franchise to
citizens who were materially independent."' Like many
seventeenth and eighteenth century political thinkers,
Kant assumed that granting the vote to servants, tenant
farmers, and married women would only increase the
influence of their powerful employers, landlords, and
husbands.113 Of course the result was that some persons
subject to the criminal laws would not-in Kant's view
could not-consent to them.
These limitations on the practicability of consent to the
criminal laws reveal that even for Kant, the legitimacy of
punishment was a matter of degree. Punishment can be
morally deserved, but it cannot be entirely just, because the
institution inflicting it is ultimately irreconcilable with the
moral autonomy of those on whom it is inflicted. In this
sense, retributive justice is a practical end that can be
achieved more or less well, and the degree of success
depends not only on whether a particular sanction is
deserved, but also on the extent to which the law imposing
it is democratically legitimate. 14
Given Kant's emphasis on individual autonomy, why
does he accept majority consent as a substitute for
individual consent?1 5 And why is he satisfied with an
approximation of retributive justice? I think the answers
112. Id. at 120-21.
113. Rosen, supra note 86, at 14, 35-36.
114. Id. at 57.
115. Id. at 49.
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to these important questions are to be found in his
conception of moral imperatives as cooperative institutions.
We have already seen that Kant views legal institutions
like property as core examples of such cooperative
institutions. For Kant, all our efforts to pursue our chosen
ends depend upon a sphere of freedom of action protected
by law. Without freedom from violence and secure
possession of the tools and resources we require, such
planning and striving would be futile. To pursue almost
any practical end is therefore to take advantage of the
security provided by -law,and to imply assent to law.116
Thus, to refuse assent to the criminal laws is almost always
to exploit their benefits and so to act according to a non-
universalizable principle of action, thereby violating a
moral imperative." ' As far as Kant was concerned, there
was no practical alternative to a legal order: he agreed
with Hobbes that banditry or civil war would surely involve
greater inhibitions on autonomy than authoritarian rule.
Thus far, Kant has demonstrated a moral obligation to
support law in general, but not a moral obligation to
respect any particular laws or legal regime. Yet, Kant
insisted that citizens have a moral obligation to obey and
defend any legal order they find themselves subject to,
whether or not it is just."' The next premise in Kant's
argument is that freedom from coercion is necessarily a
political achievement, not available in a state of nature. In
such a condition, individuals might find respite from
coercion by hiding from their fellows, but the legal "right"
to be free from coercion can only be available within a legal
system. 19 Thus, a complaint of unjust coercion address an
organized political community, and appeals to a set of
authoritative norms. Such a complaint therefore.
presupposes the authority of some actual legal system, and
so assent to the authority of such a legal system is logically
116. Rosen, supra note 86, at 124-25, 128.
117. Murphy, supra note 87, at 135.
118. Kant, Metaphysical Elements, supra note 82, at 124-25; Rosen, supra note
86, at 19, 119.
119. Rosen, supra note 86, at 10.
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necessary to avoid self-contradiction. Moreover, this legal
system must be one recognized by the audience being
addressed. One difference between law and morality is
that law is systematic. An individual can subject herself to
moral principles on her own, even if no one joins her. But
because law is an institution, an individual can assent to
law only by joining with others: the act of making law is
inherently a collective, political act. Accordingly, the
obligation to support law implies the obligation to
cooperate with others in supporting some particular legal
system.
So Kant was-like Bentham-an institutional
positivist, who considered the concept of consent virtually
meaningless outside of some kind of legally authorized
procedure for expressing consent. On such reasoning, to
express political consent or opposition to a particular law or
legal regime an individual must be constituted with others,
by law, as citizens of a polity. 2' No individual can make,
alter, or overthrow law on her own. A law is not merely an
opinion. Indeed, no group can legislate simply by
expressing a preference, because laws can only be made
through an authoritative procedure. Laws become part of a
system of rules joined by what H.L.A. Hart called a rule of
recognition.' 2 ' On this reasoning, the act of lawmaking
always presupposes preexisting legal institutions.
Accordingly, Kant would argue that to advocate or support
any particular legal regime is to accept the idea that
opinions and preferences only become legally authoritative
by legal means. So one may advocate for legal reform, but
in so doing one must accept the authority of the existing
legal system.'22
This explains why majoritarian democracy satisfies
the requirement of consent. When we vote, we join a game
bound by rules. In casting our votes we do not merely
express opinions, as do participants in an opinion poll. We
carry out an official lawmaking function within a legal
120. Id. at 123, 181-82.
121. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1961).
122. Kant, Metaphysical Elements, supra note 82, at 182.
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system. In so doing, we expect and intend that if our views
are shared by a majority of those voting, they will prevail
and be enacted into laws that will be enforced coercively.
But this intention implies that if some other view is
preferred by a majority, that view will be enacted into law.
Accordingly, those who vote do actually assent to the
results of the election and to the authority of the laws
ultimately enacted. In other words, when we vote, we
cooperate with others in achieving a public good, by
constituting an authoritative lawmaking body with the
power to coerce our fellows-and ourselves. We don't
simply express a preference about what law should be
made, we assume the power to make law.
What about those who choose not to vote? While
voting clearly signifies assent to law, nonvoting does not
necessarily imply repudiation of the rule of law: voluntary
nonvoters are usually just delegating their lawmaking
discretion to their peers. This makes perfect sense, given
Kant's view that there is no rational alternative to
assenting to law. So as long as the franchise and the
conditions for its autonomous exercise were made available
to all adults, Kant was willing to ascribe to those adults
consent to the resulting laws. The important consideration,
then, is not whether the entire adult population actually
supported each law, but whether the entire adult
population had the opportunity to share in lawmaking.12 If
they were thus enfranchised as members of the sovereign
lawmaking body, the resulting law is self-imposed.
It may seem that Kant would need to make an
exception for laws that, although supported by majority
will, systematically oppress discrete minorities. Yet recall
that consent is only one of Kant's criteria for a justly
enforceable law. The law must be a moral prescription,
requiring universal compliance with a cooperative
institution from which all benefit, and the punishment
must be proportionate. So a justly enforceable law must be
fair as well as democratically legitimate, and we need only
123. Rosen, supra note 86, at 37.
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inquire into the consensual basis of laws that meet this
requirement of fairness. Justice does not leave democracy
unrestricted, but requires that the democratic sovereign act
only through generally applicable and fairly administered
legal rules.124 Kant viewed the resulting constitutionally
limited democracy as a "republic," in which a
democratically representative legislative power was
separated from an independent judiciary and executive.2
According to Kant, persons have a moral obligation to
consent to law. In a tyrannical regime, however, the law
can require persons to act immorally. Only a regime of
moral laws can reconcile the citizen's obligations to obey
law and act morally. But if such a regime is not also
democratic, the citizens' obedience to morality is coerced
rather than freely motivated by a good will. Only
democracy grants citizens the freedom to choose and assent
to moral laws. Democracy does not guarantee just laws,
because democratic majorities are also free to pass immoral
laws. But democracy is a necessary condition to legal
justice, as Kant conceives it.
IV. COMPARING UTILITARIAN AND RETRIBUTIVIST MODELS
OF POLITICAL LEGITIMACY
Most criminal law theory treats normative questions
about the imposition of punishment as moral questions.
Accordingly, criminal law theory has been organized as a
debate between utilitarian and deontological ethics. But
these moral conceptions of punishment have paradoxical
implications. Thus, an act utilitarian conception of
punishment seems to endorse framing the innocent, while a
deontological conception of punishment seems to endorse
vigilante justice. I have therefore argued that punishment
should be seen as an institution rather than a behavior and
should be evaluated politically rather than ethically. In
keeping with this program, I have reinterpreted the two
124. Id. at 50.
125. Rosen, supra note 86, at 34.
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main traditions of normative theorizing about punishment
as theories about politically legitimate institutional action
rather than as theories about morally correct individual
action.
I have argued that we should not view the "utility
principle"--which tests actions by their consequences for
the public welfare-as a moral test for the choices of
individuals. The founders of utilitarian penology, Beccaria
and Bentham, did not use the utility principle in this way.
They were not interested in preaching morality to
individuals, whom they saw as inevitably and
appropriately self-serving. Thus, they did not propose
utility as a secret test to be used in the private forum of
conscience. Instead they offered it as a public criterion, to
guide political debate about laws in a new era of democratic
revolution. In order to understand Bentham's conception of
utility, it is necessary to grasp two essential points. First,
he did not propose this criterion in isolation. He proposed
it as part of a comprehensive new decision-making
technology, involving bureaucratic investigation,
democratic oversight and participation, legislative
supremacy, and a clear and common language of policy
analysis and legislation. Second, Bentham gave a
particular content to the hedonistic element in his utility
criterion. He did not mean by happiness simply
satisfaction of desire or unrestricted choice. Instead, he
meant freedom from fear and anxiety, and the secure
foreknowledge that one had the means to meet one's future
needs. This meant creating a powerful, but democratically
controlled and rule-bound welfare state. Despite the fact
that Bentham saw each individual as the best judge of her
own happiness, he did not really leave people free to define
and pursue their own happiness as individuals. Instead, he
compelled them to participate in a collective, political
process of defining and securing the public welfare. This
public welfare was not simply there to be discovered, a
matter of adding up private wants. Instead, it was a
political construct, to be developed by following a certain
institutional process. It inhered not just in the
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consequences of the policies chosen, but in the means by
which those policies would be chosen and implemented.
Utilitarian penology is premised on this model of
utility as an institutionally defined and legally
implemented conception of the public welfare. Accordingly,
utilitarian punishment depends on a legislatively codified
body of specific and prospective criminal proscriptions, and
a regime of legally regulated and publicly monitored
procedures for imposing and inflicting punishment. A
utilitarian system of punishment would certainly neither
mandate nor permit the framing of the innocent. It is
conceivable that such a system could make use of other
consequentialist policies criticized by retributivists, such as
preventive detention or other decisions conditioning harsh
treatment on judgments of future dangerousness. But
these kinds of policies are far less attractive from the
utilitarian standpoint than commonly supposed. Insofar as
they rely on discretionary, speculative judgments by public
officials, they are incompatible with the severe limits on
administrative discretion required in the utilitarian policy
process. In general, critics of utilitarianism have greatly
exaggerated its totalitarian potential because they have
assumed it is concerned only with the threats individuals
might pose to the public's security. They have not realized
the extent to which utilitarianism is concerned with
controlling the possibly much greater threat that
unfettered state officials might pose. In so doing, critics
have forgotten utilitarianism's historical origins in an age
of liberal democratic revolt against absolutist monarchy.
Utilitarian penology began as a movement to reduce the
harshness and arbitrariness of punishment. As such, it
was part of a larger project of legitimating state force by
bringing it under democratic and constitutional control.
Kantian retributivism was born in the same era. Like
Bentham, Kant considered punishment as a legal
institution rather than an individual behavior.
Punishment was a form of legal coercion, an infringement
of moral autonomy. As such, it was justifiable only as a
collectively self-imposed means of securing to everyone a
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limited, but fair scope for the exercise of autonomy. Like
Bentham, Kant conceived the problem of punishment as a
problem of political theory, rather than a moral problem.
For Kant, justice was an evaluative criterion that
presupposed a legal system. As a result, Kant's conception
of justice combined considerations of morality and
legitimacy. A law met the moral test if it used or
threatened to use coercive force against persons
committing immoral actions-actions that hypocritically
exploited a cooperative institution to achieve an unfair
advantage. But the fact that a law's proscriptions
conformed to Kantian morality did not suffice to make
them just. If the criminal laws did not effectively constrain
the immoral behavior they forbade, they did not achieve
justice. While good intentions may suffice to make actions
moral, Kantian justice depends on results. But even moral
and effectual laws are not just unless they are also
accepted by those subject to them. Thus Kantian justice
depends on his conception of freedom as submission to a
self-imposed law. A law meets Kant's collective consent
test fully if it is made by a representative legislature, freely
chosen by a majority of those choosing to vote, among an
electorate consisting of all adults subject to the law. An
electoral choice counts as free only if it is based on
adequate information and was not constrained by material
dependence. Kant recognized that this kind of democratic
legitimacy was a' matter of degree, and held that citizens
were obliged to obey laws and uphold legal systems that
were partially, or even wholly illegitimate.
While Kant and Bentham both conditioned the
legitimacy of state force on democratic lawmaking, they
disagreed about the features of state force that needed
legitimation. For Bentham, it was the state's infliction of
pain or unhappiness. For Kant, it was the state's use cf
coercion, which infringed the individual's autonomy. For
Bentham, the value of utility was the key to both the
problem of legitimacy, and its solution. For Kant,
autonomy was the master value that defined and solved the
problem. But these two concepts have considerable
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overlap. For Bentham, utility was not just the fulfillment
of desire. It included the assurance of future satisfaction
derived from having options secured. Since utility required
the expectation of having choices, it included a kind of
autonomy. On the other hand, Kantian autonomy turned
out to include consequentialist and hedonistic elements
that we associate with utility. Thus Kantian autonomy
depends not just on having a choice, but on satisfaction in
the choice. That is why a coercive threat, by depriving an
actor of satisfaction in a chosen course of action, infringes
her autonomy. Thus, autonomy depends not just on having
options, but on the concrete possibility of fulfilling desires
by choosing those options. To the extent that Benthamite
utility requires the security provided by having certain
choices, while Kantian autonomy includes a measure of
satisfaction in the choices made, the two concepts are not
as different as they might seem.
On a conventional understanding, the concepts of
utility and autonomy confer legitimacy in quite different
and even incompatible ways. Thus, it is commonly
assumed that only the consequences of policy matter on a
utility analysis and that only the origin of policy matters on
an autonomy analysis. Thus, we tend to assume that a
utilitarian analysis imposes no a priori constraints on
government, making legitimacy entirely contingent on
what citizens actually desire. Conversely, we generally
assume that an autonomy analysis is entirely a matter of
such a priori constraints, and that it ignores consequences.
In fact, however, we have seen that neither
assumption is correct. Bentham's peculiar conception of
utility as security, and his use of this conception as a public
standard for settling political disagreements, in effect
converted utility into a process value. A utilitarian policy
had to arise as a result of a particular kind of political
process and had to preserve the requisite conditions for
that process. It follows that this utilitarian policy process
imposes many a priori constraints on utilitarian policy.
The result is that individuals are guaranteed an elaborate
370
PUNISHMENT THEORY
regime of rights involving free speech,2 6  political
participation, and protections against arbitrary or
excessive punishment. On the other hand, we have seen
that Kant deployed his conception of autonomy not just as
a procedural constraint on the making of policy, but also as
a desired end. Thus, even if criminal law were to infringe
unjustly the autonomy of those it threatened and punished,
it would still be necessary to prevent the greater
infringements of autonomy that would result from a state
of anarchy. And a criminal law that failed to influence
behavior would fail to fulfill its proper function of
preventing these violations of autonomy. Accordingly,
Kant can fairly be categorized as a rights-consequentialist,
who judges legal systems by their success in securing to
each person, her fair share of autonomy.
Thus Bentham and Kant both assess legal force
generally, and criminal punishment in particular, as
political institutions rather than moral acts. Both require
that law secure to each citizen a sphere of freedom from
both private and public interference and both require that
legal force be democratically legitimate. Yet Bentham and
Kant required these broadly similar conditions for different
reasons. Bentham hoped that democratic deliberation
would be guided by the public welfare, a complex good that
includes security rights and process values, as well as
collective wealth. Kant hoped democratic deliberation
would be guided by a morality of cooperating in the
achievement of public goods and an ideal of equal
autonomy. It seems to me that there is likely to be a good
deal of overlap in the lawmaking procedures endorsed by
these two models of political legitimacy, and a good deal of
common ground between these two substantive criteria of
political value. Accordingly, there is reason to hope that
debate about utility and autonomy in criminal lawmaking
will become more productive once it is redefined as a
political debate about institutions rather than a moral
debate about the conduct of criminals and officials.
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